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NOTES' -
The Plotzki case illustrates a weakness in the traditional statement of the
attractive nuisance doctrine. The propensity of courts to attempt abstractly
to rule that particular conditions may and others may not be "attractive
nuisances,' 38 coupled with a fear that to once allow recovery for an infant
drowning is to impose liability in every such instance, perhaps even where a
natural pond is involved, has led to a questionable crystalization in the tort
law of Indiana." But the fear of strict liability-advanced by some as a
reason for repudiating the attractive nuisance doctrine 4 -- is justified only so
long as the mistaken idea of "nuisance" (which implies strict liability)
pervades the opinions.41 The attractive nuisance cases, regardless of labels,
are properly in the area of "negligence," where liability flows only from
unreasonable conduct depending on the circumstances of each case.4
2
TAXATION OF ROYALTIES RECEIVED BY THE EMPLOYED
INVENTOR
When the owner of patents or inventions transfers them in exchange for
royalties, the return in excess of basis is considered for tax purposes a capital
gain rather than ordinary income.' However, certain qualifications to this
rule stand ready to frustrate the quest for favorable capital rates. There must
(1942). Insulation of electric wiring at certain places is required by statute in Indiana
although it involves some expense. IND. STAT. ANN. § 20-304, (Burns 1950 Repl.).
38. See 9 ORE. L. Rav. 190, 191-192 (1930).
39. The Plotzlki case should be compared with the following recent cases in other
jurisdictions in which a landowner was held liable for an infant drowning: Saxton v.
Plum Orchards, 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949); Gimmestead v. Rose Bros. Co., 194
Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935) ; Williams v. Morristown, 222 S.W.2d 607 (Tenn. App.
1946) (on demurrer), modified 189 Tenn. 124, 222 S.W.2d 615 (1946) ; Angelier v. Red
Star Y. & P. Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1934) (on demurrer); Altenback v.
Leheigh V. R.R., 339 Pa. 272, 37 A.2d 429 (1944).
40. See Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission,
11 HARV. L. REV. 434, 435-439 (1898).
41. See Coffey v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 252 Wis. 473, 479, 32 N.W.2d 235, 238 (1948),
[1949] Wis. L. REv. 598.
42. See Gimmestead v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N.W. 194, 196 (1935);
Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948) passin. See also Hudson,
The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARV. L. REV. 826, 844-853 (1923) ; Green,
Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder Iv. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MIcH.
L. REv. 495, 522 (1923).
A court may be reluctant to leave the fate of the landowner-always favored in the
law-to the jury which may not fully appreciate his position. Yet, this does not excuse
casting a decision in a particular case as a rule of law which, by stare decisis, will prevent
a practical judgment of the rights of parties in subsequent litigation. See Bohlen, Mixed
Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. OF PA. L. REV. 111, 119-122 (1924).
1. Burnett v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) ; Hofferbert v. Briggs, 178 F.2d 743 (4th
Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v.
Adamson, 161 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d
Cir. 1942) ; See Commissioner v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1944). See
also Greenlee and Kramer, Capital Gains on Sales of Patents, 26 TAXES 779 (1948).
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be ownership of a property interest which can be sold,2 retention of the same
for six months,3 and escape found from the exclusions from capital assets
defined in § 117 (a) 4 of. the Internal Revenue Code (unless § 117(j) applies). 5
A recent case may portend a desirable trend toward denial of capital rates
to the employed inventor in order to align taxation of royalties with the
actualities of business relationships.
In Blum v. Commissioner,' decided in 1950, the taxpayer was hired to
further develop preconceived ideas about the construction of a chain saw.
Under the interrelated agreement, (as found to have resulted from an original
employment contract and two negotiated modifications of it) with the Disston
Company he was bound to assign any ensuing patents to the company for a
certain rate of royalties (which the negotiations resulting in the later two
contracts had increased).7 While seven of the taxpayer's patents were pend-
ing he left Disston but later assigned these plus two subsequently applied
for. He continued to receive a percentage of the sales. The Commissioner's
refusal to consider the royalty payments as capital gains was upheld by the
Tax Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Since the taxpayer had
been hired to invent and was bound to assign, the patents had at all times
been the exclusive property of the Disston Corpany. The employe's only
interest in the patents was to receive the emolument provided in the employ-
ment agreement, which, therefore, was ordinary income."
2. INT. REV. CODE § 117(a) provides: "The term 'capital asset' means property held
by the taxpayer. . . ." (Italics added.)
3. INT. REV. CODE § 117(a) and (b).
4. These are: stock in trade which would be included in inventory if on hand at the
close of the taxable year; property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of trade or business; property, used in trade or business, of a character which is
subject to allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1) ; real property used in
the trade or business; a copyright; a literary, musical, or artistic composition; or similar
property held by a taxpayer who by his efforts created such property or held by a
taxpayer whose basis is at least partly determined by reference to the basis of the creator;
certain obligations of the United States.
5. Under § 117(j) when there are gains upon involuntary conversion of property
used in the trade or business or capital assets, or from the sale or exchange of certain
property used in the trade or business, the gain is capital; but when from these occur-
rences loss results which is greater than the gain from like occurrences, that loss is
deductible as ordinary.
6. 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950), affirning 11 T.C. 101 (1948).
7. Under all three "contracts" the taxpayer was to receive a regular monthly income
as well as a certain percentage of net sales on saws the Disston Company might manu-
facture and sell. The later two agreements merely changed parts of those previously
made. The assignment clause of the third stated, "If you obtain a patent (or patents)
and assign it (or them) to this company, the said 10% commission will be payable during
the life of the patent (or patents)." This clause read separately would seem to indicate
that it was left to the taxpayer's discretion whether he would assign to Disston. A re-
jected argument, based on this language, was that taxpayer owned the inventions which
he later sold to his employer for royalties. Arthur N. Blum, 11 T.C. 101, 106 (1948).
8. INT. REv. CODE § 22(a)*and §§ 11 & 12.
NOTES
Thus, § 117 rates are not applied to royalties when the inventor is bound
to assign" since he could not sell a capital asset because equitabld title to the
invention vested in the employer from its inception."0 A mere employer-
employee relationship will not bind the employee to assign;"- but when an
inventor is retained, the usual contract contains the obligatory assigmnent
clause. 12 Even without this provision, employment to invent or to pursue a
9. Where an inventor is not bound to assign future inventions and develops them on
his own time and expense, courts have held that he has property which he may later sell
as capital assets. Edward C. Meyers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946); John W. Hogg, 13 P-H T.C.
MEm. DEc. 144,066 (1944).
10. When the employee contracts to assign all future inventions for a stipulated royalty
or other compensation, he is in effect contracting to sell future goods. The employer by
virtue of the fact that he is supplying the money and materials to develop the inventions
acquires an equitable security interest in the invention at the moment of its development.
Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H.L. Cas. 191 (1861) ; VOLD, SALES §§42-44 (1st ed. 1931). By
this interest the employer can compel specific performance and delivery of the inventions.
Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. 205, 206 (1874) ; Conway v. White, 9 E.2d 863, 866 (1925).
Although this equitable interest may be cut off by a transfer of the inventions to a
purchaser for value without notice, the employer has the substantial and important equitable
title which for tax purposes gives him the property in the goods from the first. Lucas v.
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930) (tax law requires a practical not a legal
test).
The patent law by its application procedure has as its purpose the preservation of
property rights in the invention to the individual inventor. See Mertz, To Whom Does the
Grant of Industrial Property Belong in the Case of an Invention by an Employee, 28 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 783 (1946). But for tax purposes to accord with business realities, courts
try to take property out of the hands of the inventor and place it in the possession of his
employer. Quaere whether these policies are at odds. For a discussion of patent policy,
see Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 649 (1947).
11. Even though the employer is not entitled to an assignment of the patent, where
an employee in the course of his employment perfects an invention using his employer's
time, labor, and materials, the employer has a free and irrevocable license or "shop right,"
under the process or product expressed in the employe's patent. Beyond this the inventor-
employee retains his rights as owner. United States v. Dublier Condenser Corp., 289
U.S. 178 (1933), 28 TEx. L. Rav. 728 (1950).
12. Information solicited and received from a number of large and small manufac-
turers throughout the country reveals that companies and inventor-employes consider in-
ventions devised as belonging to the employer. Out of fourteen companies replying, twelve
have specific contracts which require the employee to assign any inventions and patents
conceived when so employed. Below is a typical contract:
"WITNESSETH:
"WHEREAS, the employer is engaged in the manufacture and sale of chemicals,
and in research activities for itself and others; and in all such activities utilizes patented
and secret methods, . . . which constitute a valuable part of its assets; and
"WHEREAS, the employe, whether or not directly engaged in manufacturing or research
activities, by reason of the nature of his duties may become informed of such technical
information and may be enabled to contribute improvements of new inventions; and
"WHEREAS, the employer now maintains a bonus plan, under which bonuses may, in
the discretion of its executive committee, be awarded to employes who have contributed
in an unusual degree to the success of the employer by their inventions;
"NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of and as part of the terms of the employment or
continuation of employment . . . of the employe by the employer at a wage or salary
such length of time as shall be mutually agreeable, it is agreed as follows;
"1. Any and all improvements and inventions conceived or made by the employe dur-
ing the period of his said employment, relating in any way to the activities of business of
the employer shall be disclosed promptly to the employer and shall be the SOLE AND
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specific inquiry, such as to perfect a particular instrument, poses the same
objection-lack of salable property-to the favorable rates.1"
Aside from the lack-of-property argument, the Bureau has additional
weapons in its arsenal. The Commissioner may attempt to show that the
invention was not held for the requisite six months.14 This may sometimes
be phrased in terms of an assumption that even if the inventor held property,
he was bound to assign from its first instance and could not have held it for
six months. The sale would, therefore, have been made immediately after
the creation of the invention.' 5 The conclusion sought is the same, in effect,
as a lack-of-property argument would reach. Also, it is possible to argue that
the gain is ordinary income because inventions were held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.' 6 Due to a narrow
interpretation of "customers" the argument stands little chance of success
unless sales have been made to others besides the employer ;17 and sales of
several inventions is a sine qua rion to a finding of a separate business carried
on by the inventor-the business of inventing and selling inventions.
There would seem to be slight chance for employed inventors to maintain
successfully that royalties received should be taxed under § 117. But occa-
sionally, where the inventor has greater bargaining power or merely where
the contract is drafted in a more adept manner, the employer will be given
less than the three rights-to manufacture, use, and sell-in the ensuing
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF THE EMPLOYER OR OF ITS NOMINEE: and
whenever requested to do so by the employer, the employe shall execute any and all ap-
plications, assignments, and other instruments which the employer shall deem necessary in
order to assign and convey to the employer or its nominee the sole and exclusive right,
title and interest therein. These obligations shall continue beyond the termination of the
period of employment with respect to improvements or inventions conceived or made by
the employe during the period of said employment, and shall be binding upon his assigns,
executors, administrators or other legal representatives. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
13. Property in the invention may be the employer's if it is shown conclusively that
the employee was hired to develop the invention for the employer. United States v. Dublier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). If the employee had voluntarily assigned previous
inventions, an intention is shown that the property in a later invention belongs to the
employer. Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.
1926). But property may be in the inventor-employee where he was under a contract to
assign all future inventions but in fact did not do so. After an inventor developed five
patents a new contract was made assigning them for designated royalties which the court
held were capital gains. Hofferbert v. Briggs, 178 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1949).
14. INT. REv. CODE § 117(a) (2)-(11) and § 117 (b). The six months holding period
begins with the moment that the idea, process, or invention is reduced to practicability and
extends until the rights are actually assigned., Samual E. Diescher, 36 B.T.A. 732, 743
(1937).
15. Paul L. Kuzmick, 11 T.C. 288, 297 (1948).
16. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941); Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153
(1948) ; Edward C. Meyers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
17. Where an employee sold two patents to his employer and one to another person, it
was held that the patents were property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of taxpayer's trade or business. Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 558 (1942).
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patents.'" Te' resulting legal relation is a license, return from which, is ordi-
nary income to the inventor. 9 The reserved rights may, therefore, con.c0.tute
property which later may be sold as a capital asset. Thus *the agreement can
allocate the realty valuable rights to the employer and reserve the usually insig-
nificant right to use20 the. patented invention to the employee with consequent'
taxation of the inventor at capital rates on royalties received after the disposal
of the reserved right. This technical and highly fictional artifice was success-
fully invoked by the taxpayer in Carl G. Dreyntann, a recent Tax Court case.2 '
18. However, relying to an extent upon certain indicia that the property in the in-
ventions reposed in them, certain taxpayers have achieved capital rates. One indication
that the taxpayer inventor owns the invention is the fact that he had ideas conceived prior
to employment. Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153 (1948) ; William M. Kelly, 16 P-H 1947
T.C. MEat. DEC. ff 47,252 (1947) (taxpayer was not originally employed as an inventor
but had other duties. During this time his basic invention coalesced. Later, when tax-
payer was employed as inventor, he assigned the invention and it was held a sale of a
capital asset); Raymond M. Hessert, 16 P-H 1947 T.C. ME~r. DEC. ff 47,301 (1947) (tax-
payer assigned patents he developed before his employment for royalties extending over
the period of. his employment. They were held to be proceeds from the sale of a capital
asset). In Blum v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950), affirmiig 11 T.C. 101
(1948), the taxpayer had preconceived ideas about the chain saw, but the employment
contracts which required him to assign to the Disston Company the resulting patents
persuaded the court that the company was not paying royalties for property the employee
owned, but merely for his aid in its development.
That the company is entering the royalty payments on its books as the purchase of a
capital asset is also an indication of the employee-inventor's ownership. In the Blum case
the Commissioner introduced evidence of a contrary nature-that the royalties were carried
as ordinary expense on the company's books. 'The reaction of the court was, "We attach
no controlling significance to such evidence. It does indicate, however, that both parties
construed their respective pertinent rights and obligations as we do." Arthur N. Blum,
11 T.C. 101, 110 (1948).
In addition, statements and conduct of the employer or inventor which indicate an
intention that the inventor own the invention until assignment are of some value in proving
that the inventor possesses the property in the invention. See note 13 supra.
19. The patentee may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant, and convey either
(1) the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention
throughout the United States, or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right,
or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the
United States. Any assignment or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license giving
the licensee no title in the patent. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
20. While the patentee can withhold from his licensee the right to use the patented
article after its manufacture, one purchasing the manufactured article from the licensee
takes free of the restriction. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). It
must be remembered that the right to use may under some patents be of considerable
value. Such may be the case for patented processes and production machinery. Here,
however, the right to sell might be the insignificant right which the patentee could
reserve so as to retain the property in the patent.
21. In Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153 (1948), the taxpayer was employed to develop
a process to waterproof boxes under a contract which required him to give the employer
the exclusive rights to manufacture and sell. After the process was developed, taxpayer
assigned all rights in the resulting patent to the employer in exchange for a percentage of
income derived from sales of the waterproofed boxes. The court held that this was a sale
of a capital asset and the royalties were taxed at capital rates. The possibility that the
taxpayer may have been employed to invent was not considered; it was assumed that
from its creation the property was in the inventor since he reserved the right to use.
The Commissioner's non-acquiescence in the Dreymann case, 1950 INT. REv. BULL.
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When the Blum case is compared with Carl G. Dreymann, it is evident that
the present system of taxing inventors' royalties has become entangled with the
fine distinctions of patent and contract law. In each case the taxpayers were
employed under a contract to develop patentable inventions and both developed
the inventions while so employed; but Blun's royalties were taxed as ordinary
income, while Dreymann's were not. The only apparent basis for distinction
lies in the contracts for employment: Blum was required to assign all rights in
subsequent inventions, while Dreymann gave the employer the right to manufac-
ture and sell, but not to use, any resulting inventions. The formal difference
between assigning all the patent rights and retaining only the right to use an in-
vention is almost imperceptible in practical effect and should be disregarded for
No. 16 at 1 (1950), refers for support to Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 337 U.S. 369
(1948). There royalties from the assignment by a non-resident alien of the exclusive
serial rights on a story written outside the United States were held taxable on the theory
that they were income from the use of a United States copyright. By the 1936 Revenue
Act, §§ 143, 211, 49 Stat. 1700, 1701, 1714 (1936), only gains, profits, and income from
sources in the United States were taxable to non-resident aliens, and income derived from
the sale of property in the United States by such persons was not taxable. The question
arose as to whether the payment was return for the sale of property or taxable income
under the statute. The dissent, 337 U.S. 369, 401-425 (1948) (Justices Frankfurter,
Murphy, and Jackson dissenting), pointed out that less than all the rights under a copy-
right may be. sold as property. Apparently the dissenters felt that the majority opinion
approved taxation of the sale of certain property rights as ordinary income. Drawing
an analogy from copyrights to patents, the conclusion would be that a patent merely
privileges the holder to use the patent and that the income from this use is ordinary in-
come in all cases, even though the use made is to grant all the rights-to manufacture, use
and sell. The validity of this argument can be questioned, especially in the light of the
peculiarities inherent in Wodehouse.
The strongest case to which the Commissioner could apply the above argument is
where the inventor is employed, and invention evolves, and payments are received periodi-
cally and not as a lump sum. The proceeds will be tinged with the color of employment
compensation rather than that of a sale. Right to income is not a capital asset. Hort v.
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
There are various reasons why the Wodehouse argument may fail: (1) Tax decisions
have long acquiesced in the difference between an assignment of all rights, which is
termed a sale, and the mere licensing of some of the rights. The courts may not now
want to place sales and assignments on the same basis as licenses without the spur of a
definite legislative mandate. (2) All property in a sense is the right to income. Surely
the Commissioner would not attempt to tax the gain from a sale of realty as ordinary in-
come, for this would clearly be outside the capital gain treatment expressly allowed.
(3) The majority in the Wodehouse case based its decision purely on a statutory basis
without deciding whether assignment of serial rights was a property sale. The dissent
raised the latter point. This discrepancy may considerably weaken the case as precedent.
(4) Since Wodehose was a copyright case it may not be strong precedent in the instance
of a patent purchase. Courts seem to treat patents as more necessary to the economy.
United States v. Dublier Condenser Co., 289 U.S. 178, 206 (1933). Generally a patented
invention requires more thought, time, skill, and effort to develop than a copyrighted
article. Also a patent usually requires exploitation after issuance, whereas a copyrighted
article is ready for publication immediately. As a result, although the copyright may be
treated as a governmental privilege to use the article in the United States, or, in other
words, a right to income, a patent will tend to be taxed as a property right and not merely
as a privilege to use the patented invention in the United States, or a right to income.
NOTES
tax purposes. 22 To tax substance here requires that the royalty income, which,
regardless bf the niceties of contract language, does not flow from the sale of a
beneficial interest in property, should be subject to ordinary rates.
Much criticism has been leveled at capital taxation of royalties however
received. 23  Contrast the inventor's royalty to the income of the lawyer who
may work for many years to develop abilities culminating in receipts of large
sums in one year or over a short span of years. This latter income is taxed
at ordinary rates. It wbuld seem tenable to.argue that a rational distinction
cannot be drawn between the lawyer's and the inventor's incomes.24 Indeed,
when the additional compensation to the employed inventor is' an award or
bonus, ordinary rates do apply.25 The agitation to directly remove inventions,
copyrights, and works of art from the pale of capital gains rates met with
only partial success in the recent changes in the Code. Capital assets as
defined by § 117(a) and § 117(j) of the 1950 Revenue Act do not include
copyrights and works of art.26 Patents were not specifically listed in the
new act because the Senate Committee felt that the desirability of fostering
the work of inventors outweighed the small additional revenue which might
be collected by their exclusion from the capital assets category.2 7 This does
not mean that the obstacles discussed will not harass the inventor-taxpayer.
A possible solution may be to abolish taxation of receipts from patented
inventions. As a substitute some authorities suggest that a tax should be
levied on the patent right itself, as done in England.2  An alternative
22. See Casey, Sale of Patents, Copyrights and Royalty Interests, SEVENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 383 (1949).
The courts seem to have forgotten the admonition of Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus
Co., 308 U.S. 252, 253 (1939) : "In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws and
courts are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not
rigidly binding."
23. Miller, The Capital Asset Concept: A Critiqie of Capital Gains Taxation, 59
YALE L.J. 837, 1057 (1950) ; Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under
the Federal Income Tax, 26 TEx. L. REv. 440 (1948).
24. By giving the inventor favorable tax rates, Congress feels that invention will be
encouraged, SEN. REP. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1950) ; actually, however, most
invention is done under the auspices of corporate research and will be done without
favorable tax encouragement.
25. With regard to the solicitation of information referred to in note 9 supra, it was
discovered that most companies gave extra compensation in the form of cash bonuses,
United States Savings Bonds, or common stock in the company to their employed in-
ventors for contributing to a successful invention. These payments are usually treated by
inventors as ordinary income just as any other bonuses received for good work. Courts
have little trouble in calling them extra compensation.
26. INT. REV. CODE § 117(a) "The term 'capital assets' means property held by tax -
payer . . . but does not include . . . (C) A copyright; a literary, or musical composition;
or similar property . . ." See also § 117(j).
27. SEN. REP. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1950).
28. The patent laws of the United States have never required the payment of periodic
fees during the life of a patent. If such a system were put into effect, the tax could be
adjusted by basing the rate (which would be determined independently from the rates
on the inventor's other income) on the annual income from the patent so that the total
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
would be to :tax their,.proceeds -as ordinary income in all cases under a
"spreading" method similar to that. now existing in:§ 107(b) of the Code.29
But instead of requiring 80%. to be received in one year, -a lesser percentage
should be the measure, based on the time consumed in developing the in-
vention." This -solution would tend to reduce the unnecessary tax benefit
accorded inventors over other taxpayers engaged in selling personal services.3,
RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE TO SUE'EMPLOYER FOR AN
INTENTIONAL TORT
Workmen's compensation laws propose to make some of the consequences
of industrial accidents and.conditions a part of the cost of production to be
borne by industry and eventual1y.by society. Thus, the acts vitiate the common
law defenses to an action for negligence, which had forced the burden of in-
dustrial mishaps on the individual employees, and assure workers of definite
and speedy payments if incapacitated during the course of their employment.
In return, the employer's liability is limited to a portion of the wage loss and
medical expenses, against which he may insure. To further the policy in-
volved, the machinery of the acts is uniformly made the exclusive remedy."
A recent case, Bevis v. Arnco Steel Corporation,2 presented the issue of
income derived from filing and final fees and from the annual taxes would be approxi-
mately the same as the income realized under the present system. But this, it has been
contended, would result in the successful and more profitable patents paying more of the
country's overall tax burden. Frederico, Taxation and Survival of Patents, 19 J. PAT.
OFF. SOc'Y 671 .(1937) ; Brodahl, Taxation of the Patent Right, 17 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
482, 483 (1949).
29. INT. REV. CODE § 107(b).
30. Since it is seldom that eighty per cent will be received in one year, the percentage
should be based on the length of time necessitated to develop the patent. The following
are rough estimates of more equitable required percentages:
Length of Development Per Cent Received in One Year
Three years ........................................ 43% %
Four years ......................................... 35 %
Five years ......................................... 30 %
Six Years ......................................... 26%%
To change § 107(b) without a corresponding change in § 107(a) might partially appease
those who contend that the tax law should favor inventors.
31. Taxation of royalties at capital rates evidences one more instance of the absurd
manner in which a perhaps once valid tax favor has been bestowed. See Miller, The
Capital Asset Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 1057
(1950). The classical theory of capital rates was to tax income accruing over a long
period but received in an aggregate at rates roughly correlated to those which would have
applied had the income been taxed in the year it was realized. But receipts of royalties
are usually spread over years.
1. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COIPENSATION LAWs 2-10
(1944); 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1 (2d ed. 1932); Honnold,
Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 3 CORNELL L. Q. 264 (1918).
2. 86 Ohio App. 525, 93 N.E.2d 33 (1949), aff'd neme., 153 Ohio St. 366, 91 N.E.2d
479, cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 74 (1950). The appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court and the
petition for certiorari to the U. S. Supreme Court were based on constitutional grounds.
